Monday, April 13, 2009

Analysis of Press Coverage: Somali Pirates Seize a Ukranian Ship Carrying 33 Tanks

Analysis of Press Coverage: Somali Pirates Seize a Ukranian Ship Carrying 33 Tanks
October 26, 2008

As long as people have utilized the seas as trade routes, there has been the accompanying threat of piracy. The 17th century image of Caribbean buccaneers – wooden legged, hook handed men wearing eye patches, with parrots perched on their shoulders – has given way to a 21st century pirate stereotype which reflects how the West views Africa. Today’s pirate is portrayed as a desperate African from a failed state(Somalia) that has gone through famine. Jason McLure of Newsweek expands upon that, writing, “Former hostages report that the bandits mix the modern and the medieval. They’ve been known to slaughter goats to roast on captured ships and spend much of their time chewing the narcotic leaf khat. But they also use GPS devices, satellite phones and spies in nearby ports such as Dubai and Djibouti to find their victims.” Somali pirates are portrayed as having primitive customs and modern technology – in a sense, they are Third World people with First World devices/cunning at their disposal.

One incident of piracy has had a particularly profound effect on how Western society views Africa. On September 25, approximately 50 Somali pirates hijacked the Faina, a Ukranian vessel transporting military equipment to Kenya, and took its crew hostage. While most hijackings off the Somali coast receive little attention in the news, this incident attracted worldwide attention – partly because of the ship's cargo and the global powers that became involved.

Carrying 33 Soviet-made T-72 tanks and weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades and anti-aircraft guns, the captured Faina represents a collision between the First and Third World. Somali pirates, hailing from one of the world’s most impoverished and war torn countries, now confront NATO, European Union and Indian warships, not to mention U.S. Navy ships that patrol the region. In Western media, this is often framed as the haves (navies of the industrialized world) vs. the have-nots (pirates), with Somali pirates serving as the classic underdog.

Familiar patterns can be seen in the stories written by foreign correspondents. Reports bolster the belief that Africa is a place one would never want to visit, continually emphasizing Somalia's lawlessness and poverty. The rhetorical device of debasement, described by David Spurr in The Rhetoric of Empire, is at work, as readers are reminded of Somalia's violence and justice by the barrel of a gun.

The rhetorical device of aestheticization, enabling Somali pirates to be placed in a story we can understand and relate to from literary experience, is also prominent. Headlines and leads often reach for legendary/mythic characters like Blackbeard and Captain Hook, and attempt to shock readers with the news that piracy is alive and well in the 21st century – it's not just the domain of fairy tales. Somali pirates are sometimes idealized as “eco-warriors,” as they claim to be protecting the country's maritime resources from overzealous international fishing vessels. Some are viewed as “Robin Hoods” of the sea, as they steal from the wealthy and promise to rebuild their broken communities. The goals of protecting the maritime environment and redistributing wealth are ones which build sympathy for the pirates' cause.

There is an added dimension to this collision and that is the public’s interest in global terrorism and disruptive forces which may contribute to it. US ships are preventing the pirates from unloading their cargo of tanks and other weaponry, which many fear will fall into the hands of Islamic insurgents with “ties” (albeit flimsy) to Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization that carried out the 9/11 attacks. Similar to suicide bombers, pirates are viewed as warriors who will do anything to achieve their objectives. “If the warships threatened, pirates would die in a last-ditch fight and risk the hostages,” a business partner of the pirates told Reuters on October 8. Thus, pirates are linked to terrorists through both suicidal behavior and affiliation.

The Faina is being held for ransom in a standoff that has now lasted close to a month. It has become clear – even in coverage of Somali pirates preceding the Faina incident – that Western media reports utilize certain lenses in telling the story of Somali pirates. This media analysis will examine three such lenses:, the post-colonial debasement of Somalia and its people, aestheticization (the packaging of piracy in an easily digestable narrative with classic character types), and the connection (or lack thereof) between Somali pirates and Islamic insurgents.

A "Failed State," A "Lawless Coastline," "Desperately Poor" People: The Debasement of Somalia

The Somali pirates are seen as a product of their environment and readers are continually reminded by foreign correspondents that it is one they would never want to visit. In a story titled "Somali pirates stare down global superpowers," Associated Press writer Elizabeth Kennedy notes that Somalia is a "failed state where a quarter of children die before they turn 5, where anybody with a gun controls the streets and where every public institution has crumbled." She writes that the standoff aboard the Faina "begs the question: How can a bunch of criminals from one of the poorest and most wretched countries on Earth face off with some of the world's richest and well-armed superpowers?" While foreign reporters acknowledge that pirates are often paid handsome ransoms, their wealth still stands amidst squalor. "In the raw frontier port of Bosaso ... shiny new mansions have sprouted amid smoldering garbage dumps," writes Paul Salopek of the Chicago Tribune.

David Spurr would perhaps argue that the rhetorical device of debasement is being employed in these references to Somalia. Western media outlets focus on several negative aspects of Somalian life: extreme poverty, disrepair, lawlessness and the absence of a stable government.

Poverty - and desperation to escape it - is a consistent theme in explaining why Somalis choose to become pirates. In an April 2008 AP piece (“Somali pirates find booming business”), a pirate named Siyad “said his decision to become a pirate was a matter of survival. Impoverished and with no job prospects, he saw two options: risk his life by fleeing Somalia in a leaky boat to the more prosperous countries across the Gulf of Aden, or join up with pirates who were flush with cash.” Similarly, Xan Rice of the Guardian writes that “the chaotic and desperate situation on land in Somalia means that there is no shortage of young gunmen eager to join in the lucrative plunder at sea, regardless of risk.” While the stories typically quote Somalis and share the motives of actual pirates, they are often told through the eyes of one or two individuals – rather than a broader cross-section of Somali society, which may indeed reject this career path.

Disrepair is another theme of the coverage. Readers are given the most miserable view of Somalia – a place where the streets are often abandoned, anything mechanical that works is on the verge of breaking down, and there is a general sense of the unfixable. Even when the authorities take action against pirates, we are reminded of such disrepair. “Seven pirates are serving time in the dilapidated Bosaso jail, a government spokesman said,” writes the Chicago Tribune's Salopek, although one doubts that the government spokesman himself described the jail as dilapidated.

Another theme is the absence of a stable government. Readers are constantly reminded in these stories that the Somali government collapsed in 1991, the implication being that pirates are the product of failed states. It is an interesting conclusion, given that Yemen still has a functional government and an abundance of pirates that it is fighting with its Coast Guard. Furthermore, pirates have existed throughout history with state-support – f.e., the Barbary pirates who hailed from Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco and Algiers. There is no evidence to support that having a stable, functioning government eliminates acts of piracy – it just means that there will be a great capacity to suppress it if a country so desires.

Without mentioning those functioning governments that still struggle with piracy off their shores, most foreign reporters still identify 1991 as the key year in enabling Somalia's pirates. Since then, the Tribune's Salopek writes that “Somalia's lawless coastline has been ravaged by unscrupulous outsiders with impunity” and “Somalia's unpatrolled waters became a cost-free dumping ground for industrial waste from Europe.” The New York Times Jeffrey Gettleman presents a similar fulcrum in Somalia’s history, noting that, “Somalia's central government system imploded in 1991, casting the country into chaos. With no patrols along the shoreline, Somalia's tuna-rich waters were soon plundered by commercial fishing fleets from around the world.” In much more staid, undramatic fashion, the BBC reports that “Somalia has not had an effective national government for 17 years, leading to a collapse of law and order both on land and at sea.”

Aestheticization: Pirates As “Eco-Warriors” and “Robin Hoods” of the Sea

Commentators – and even some reporters - utilize two broad assumptions which often champion the Somali pirates and legitimize their behavior. The first assumption is that Somali pirates are poor bandits stealing from the rich and giving back to their communities; a second assumption is that the pirates are acting out of concern for their coastal waters, which have frequently been invaded by foreign fishing vessels. Writing for the East African, Paul Goldsmith says the “pirates of Puntland are social bandits in the tradition of Robin Hood, not buccaneers. They steal from the rich and share the cash with extremely poor communities.” Murithi Mutiga writes for the Observer that the pirates “are regarded as unlikely eco-warriors ... the UN says the long Somalia coast is a favorite dumping point for ships with toxic waste. Illegal fishing is rampant. In this context, piracy is seen as one way of benefiting from a precious water resource from which the locals have in effect been elbowed out.” The Tribune’s Salopek further writes of an “aggrieved buccaneer (who) said he and his men were merely exacting a tax for years of foreign poaching in Somalia’s fish-rich waters.” In both cases (Robin Hood and eco-warrior), the Somali pirates are linked to rebel role models.

In the typical narrative, Somali pirates are portrayed not as equals in combat, but resourceful underdogs staring down Western naval power – even though many international shipping companies have become quite accustomed to paying ransoms totaling in the tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars and pirates are obviously succeeding at their craft. In an October 2 report, Jonathan Adams of the Christian Science Monitor notes that “the US and Russia turned up the heat on a group of vastly outgunned Somali pirates aboard a hijacked cargo vessel.” In some cases, the underdog language is flipped for that which marvels at the pirates’ ability. “The Faina’s hijacking ... illustrates the ability of a handful of pirates from a failed state to menace a key international shipping lane despite the deployment of warships by global powers,” reads an October 7 AP report.

Furthering the rhetorical practice of aestheticization, stories frequently lure readers in with references to pirates in popular culture. “Deep in what this weekend became the most notorious pirate hideout since Neverland, Somali buccaneers are currently hunkered down in the Indian Ocean with the biggest pillage of their biggest year,” writes Popular Mechanics, alluding to the imaginary home of Disney’s Peter Pan and Captain Hook.

Whenever possible, reporters also use unprovable superlatives. A Bloomberg story is headlined “Somali Pirates Turn Route to Suez Into ‘Most Dangerous’ Waters.” An October 18 AP report from Michelle Faul notes that “military vessels from 10 nations are now converging on the world’s most dangerous waters.” If these are the most dangerous waters, how are we measuring that and who is conducting the measurements? There is rarely an operational definition or metric supporting such superlatives.

Connecting The Somali Pirates To Islamic Insurgents: Tenuous Ties At Best

One critical failing of the US press corps has been its tendency to tie Somali pirates to al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic "radicals." There is scant evidence to suggest that there is any connection between the two. And as more discerning publications – typically in the UK – point out, the Somali Islamists who gained control of the country for six months in 2006 stamped out piracy during their rule. “The pirates were largely put out of business two years ago when the hardline Union of Islamic Courts seized control of Somalia. But the Islamists were ousted by Ethiopian forces, leaving a power vacuum, and the pirates returned,” reported Rob Crilly and Matthew Campbell for the Times of London. Daily Telegraph reporter Aislinn Simpson noted that “a US-backed invasion by Ethiopia to topple the Islamist government amid fears of links to Al Qaeda ended with the country relapsing into armed factionalism and anarchy, and the resurgence of piracy."

The UK press is presenting a very different picture of the situation than we are receiving from our media. UK reports establish three essential truths: Somali pirates are not connected to Islamic insurgents, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) actually sought to end piracy, and the US-supported toppling of the UIC has allowed piracy to once again flourish.

Newsweek is one of the few US outlets to identify the role the United States played in piracy's reawakening. “Somalia's pirates have lately found a surprising (if unwitting) ally: the United States,” wrote Jason McLure for the magazine's September 1, 2008 edition. McLure establishes that the UIC actively suppressed piracy, rather than allying with it:

Two years ago, piracy in the Horn of Africa was almost stamped out. The Islamists who took over Mogadishu and parts of Somalia in 2006 defeated several militias involved in piracy and warned others that they'd face punishment under a harsh version of Sharia.


McLure also acknowledges the role of the Bush administration in encouraging the overthrow of the UIC, a move which paved the way for a UN-backed transitional government – one that cannot control piracy:

The Bush administration—which had tried to block the Islamists' rise by supporting a rival warlord faction—suspected Somalia's new leaders of sheltering al Qaeda operatives. So Washington backed neighboring Ethiopia when it invaded in December 2006. The Ethiopians ousted the Islamists in short order and installed a U.N.-backed transitional government. But this only plunged Somalia into anarchy once more. Today the government can't even control the capital, let alone the country. Whereas the Islamists managed to enforce a period of relative calm, now dozens of militias are battling for power once more. The pirates, some backed by warlords affiliated with the transitional government, have exploited the chaos.


A striking aspect of both McLure and Simpson's reporting is the refusal to accept that the UIC was cooperating with al Qaeda. Simpson uses the phrasing “amid fears of links to Al Qaeda,” and McLure notes that the Bush administration “suspected” the UIC of sheltering Al Qaeda operatives. These reports are not taking the UIC-Al Qaeda link for granted.

Not taking your government's word for it is sadly considered blasphemy across the majority of the US press corps – and certainly among political groups seeking to affect discourse. Addressing the Faina standoff, Jim Kouri of the Conservative Voice wrote that “the spokesmen for the pirates, believed to be members and associates of Al Qaeda, were contacted via satellite communications ... In spite of the news media distancing this recent attack on a ship off the coast of Somalia from global terrorism, intelligence experts believe this is just the latest operation initiated against the United States and the West by Al Qaeda.” Which begs the question: who are these intelligence experts and did we happen to be utilizing their services in late 2002 as well?

Even the mainstream press has become eager to tie pirates to Al Qaeda – it’s not just a sport for conservative ideologues. An October 2 Boston Globe staff editorial, dramatically titled “Terrorists of the seas,” notes that Somali pirates “pump millions of dollars into local Islamist militias with links to Al Qaeda.” A September 29 AP report notes that "the U.S. fears the armaments onboard the Ukrainian vessel may end up with Al Qaeda-linked Islamic insurgents who have been fighting the shaky U.N.-backed Somali transitional government since late 2006." These are substantial charges with flimsy backing. Are pirates really contributing millions to “Islamic militias with links to Al Qaeda,” or are they simply out to profit for themselves? And do they really intend to hand off the Faina tanks to Islamic insurgents?

The New York Times Jeffrey Gettleman did what any responsible reporter would do in countering the US government's position – he called a spokesman for the pirates and asked what they intended to do:

[The spokesman] insisted that the pirates were not interested in the weapons and had no plans to sell them to Islamist insurgents battling Somalia's weak transitional government. "Somalia has suffered from many years of destruction because of all these weapons," he said. "We don't want that suffering and chaos to continue. We are not going to offload the weapons. We just want the money."


An October 3 report from Alex Perry of Time cast further doubt on the notion that Somali pirates would supply Islamic insurgents with weaponry. “Although the pirates lack the quays to take the tanks ashore, and their clan affiliations make connections to the Islamists unlikely, the U.S.S. Howard sailed to within three miles of the Faina to ensure that the tanks did not fall into Islamist hands,” wrote Perry. Nick Wadhams, another Time reporter, also conveyed skepticism in a September 26 report: “Some reports have tied the pirates to the Islamic insurgents battling the Ethiopian- and U.S.-backed Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, but experts say no concrete evidence has emerged to back this claim. Wilkes and others say the hijackers are more likely simply in the increasingly lucrative business of demanding — and receiving — ransom payments from shipowners.”

Coverage of the pirates frequently centers around their motivation: are they simply in it for the money as they insist, or are they supporting Islamic insurgents bent on the destruction of the Western world? Unfortunately, the latter conclusion is often reached by assumption rather than thorough inquiry. “We have nothing to do with insurgents or terrorist organizations, we only need money,” a pirate spokesman told the Associated Press on October 2.

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About Me

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I am a researcher, reporter and conference producer with experience spanning the aerospace & defense, biopharma, chemical, consumer electronics, energy, homeland security, human resources and IT markets.

In January I rejoined Worldwide Business Research, where I serve as program manager for Consumer Returns, SCMchem and the Digital Travel Summit.

I have an M.S. in science and medical journalism from Boston University (Dec 2008) and did my undergraduate work at Indiana University, majoring in journalism and political science (May 2001). After interning for the Chicago Tribune as a collegian, I landed my first real gig in the Windy City: I was a senior technology writer for I-Street magazine (Sept 2001-Feb 2003). I covered nanotech and biotech startups. From March-November 2003, I worked for a newsletter publisher (Exchange Monitor Publications) in DC, covering congressional hearings, the NRC & DHS.


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